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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
BERT T. McKee, 
Plaintiff and Applicant, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, and 
PACIFIC STATES CAST IRON 
PIPE COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
CASE 
NO. 7258 
Certiorari to review the decision of the Industrial Com-
mission denying compensation to Bert T. McKee for back 
injuries sustained while an employee of Pacific States Cast 
Iron Pipe Company. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
References hereafter are to the pages of the record as 
the pages of the file and transcripts are consecutively num-
bered in red on such original record. 
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The applicant, Bert T. McKee, was originally employed 
by the defendant company in 1935 (66). Prior to the year 
1937, he had no trouble with his back, despite his engaging 
in heavy farm and other work (68, 93; see also Applicant's 
Exhibit "C"). In 1937, while employed by Pacific States 
Cast Iron Pipe Company, an employer subject to the Work-
men's Compensation Act (57), he suffered a sudden and 
paintful injury as the result of an industrial accident (67, 
70). He was paid compensation by his employer for a week 
or so as a result thereof and thereupon was told by the 
company doctor that he was all right and returned to work 
(70). 
Between 1937 and 1944, he worked intermittently for 
the Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe- Company and others, with-
out difficulty with his back, thinking it was all right (71), 
until February of the latter year, when while employed 
by the defendant company, he suffered a further violent, 
sudden back injury in lifting heavy pipe in the course of his 
employment (72). Something snapped in his back, and he 
doubled up (73). This injury was reported to his foreman, 
who told him to go home (72). He left work on account 
thereof, reporting first to a chiropractor (73) and there-
after to Dr. Orton, and then to Fred Taylor, the company 
doctor (73, 95). 
Dr. Taylor had x-rays taken of the applicant, and after 
his examination of·them, reported by letter to the company, 
(Applicant's Exhibit "A"), and also verbally to applicant 
(73, 95) that there was no injury to McKee's back, but that 
his difficulty was "muscle spasm", "lumbago" or "rheuma-
ti&m", requiring a change in occupation and that he should 
never do. any more manual labor by reason thereof. Even 
after Dr. Taylor looked at the x-rays, he told McKee his 
1 
I' 
I 
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back was all right (74); no one except Dr. Taylor and the 
pipe company had the benefit of those x-rays until the hear-
ing (87, 110). 
The pipe company released McKee in 1944 because of 
the recommendation of Dr. Taylor, and McKee, relying up-
on the diagnosis of this company doctor (74) sought other 
employment (76). He began to experience recurring dif-
ficulty with his back. Assuming, upon Dr. Taylor's advice, 
that it was rheumatism or some other difficulty not con-
nected with accident (76) he sought the services of another 
physician who, knowing of Dr. Taylor's diagnosis after x-
rays, accepted and relied upon such diagnosis (82, 103, 109), 
and treated Mr. McKee for muscular spasms and rheuma-
tism until 1946, when because of the severity of the back 
difficulty, he had other x-rays taken (10), which led to an 
examination by Dr. PaulS. Richards, of Bingham Canyon, 
in 1947, and the diagnosis definitely of an unstable fifth lum-
bar vertebrae (20). In fact, Dr. Taylor's x-rays show€d 
the same condition that subsequent x-rays revealed (159), 
and it was only when Dr. Orton's x-rays were taken in 1946 
that McKee was put on notice in any way of his back in-
jury (77). Dr. Paul Richards later diagnosed the condition 
as an unstable fifth lumbar vertebrae, and advised a spinal 
fusion (104, 158). 
His right leg started to "drag" in 1946, although he 
continued his employment in a service station (76-77). 
Since then the difficulty has gotten worse, with more pain 
and more paralysis or paralyzing effect (78). In Novem-
ber, 1947, he was put in bed and weights were put on his 
leg. He was confined for eight weeks at that time (78), 
but later returned to work at the service station, where he 
is now experiencing extreme difficulty (79, 97). 
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It is undisputed that the x-rays taken by the company's 
physician, Dr. Taylor, showed the back defect (159), and 
yet, not only did Dr. Taylor assure the defendant that noth-
ing was wrong with his back and that his sole difficulty 
was muscular spasms, rheumatism or lumbago, but at his 
own doctor's suggestion, and in accordance with the sug-
gestion of the Industrial Commission, McKee, prior to fil-
ing his application, asked for an opportunity to have his 
physician examine the x-rays and the company refused to 
let him have them! (79-80). 
The record is especially clear and undisputed that the 
applicant, McKee, as well as his family physician, Dr. Or-
ton, relied upon Dr. Taylor, and the assurance of this doc-
tor acting in the capacity of the company doctor, and also 
representatives of the company, that there was nothing 
wrong with his back (173, 50, 96, 167), until during 1946-
1947, as a result of additional x-rays taken by Dr. Orton 
and the diagnosis of Dr. Richards, it was discovered that 
the difficulty was not lumbago, muscular spasms or rheu-
matism, but a substantial back injury, apparent not only 
on Dr. Orton's and Dr. Richards' x-rays, but also on the 
very x-rays which the company doctor had before him when 
he assured McKee that there was nothing wrong with his 
back. It is also undisputed that McKee's paralysis is be-
coming more marked, and that now he has difficulty in do-
ing even light work. 
. The. applicant is married and has two minor children 
(65-66). His rate of pay was fifty-seven cents per hour, 
working five days per week (14, 66). 
The Industrial Commission, after hearing the testi-
mony adduced by the parties and reviewing the exhibits 
received and made a part of the record, found that the ap-
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plicant did sustain an injury by accident arising out of, or 
in the course of, his employment on February 21st, 1944; 
that the applicant, while carrying and stacking 5-foot pipe, 
felt something snap in his back which caused terrific pain; 
that on May 28th, 1948, the applicant filed an application 
for a hearing for compensation benefits; that all jurisdic-
tional facts were admitted by the defendant except that the 
applicant suffered an accidental injury, as found by the 
Commission, and that the application for compensation was 
filed more than four years after the date of the accident 
(47-48). 
The Commission concluded in view of the provisions 
of Section 42-1-92, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, and of the 
fact that the applicant did not file his application within 
three years from the date of the injury that the application 
should be denied, and it was so ordered ( 48). 
An application for re-hearing on the ground that the 
Commission erred in concluding that the claim was barred 
was duly filed (49), but was denied by the Commission 
(52). 
ERRORS RELIED UPON AND QUESTIONS 
FOR DETERMINATION 
Since it has been conceded, or has been found by the 
Commission, that the employer was subject to the Act, that 
the applicant did sustain an injury arising out of his em-
ployment, and that all other· jurisdictional facts prerequi-
site to an award are present, the only question that remains 
is whether the claim of Bert T. McKee is barred by any 
statute of limitations. If the claim is barred, the decision 
of the Industrial Commission must be upheld; if the claim 
is not barred, either by reason of estoppel to raise the stat-
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ute, waiver of the statute, or otherwise, the applicant is en-
titled to compensation. 
Thus is raised the sole question in this case-whether 
applicant's claim is barred by the statute of ljmitations in 
view of the facts established by the record. 
ARGUMENT 
THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY 
ANY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, AND THE DEFEND-
ANT IS ESTOPPED FROlVl RELYING UPON ANY SUCH 
STATUTE. 
Section 42-1-92, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, provides 
in part as follows: 
"If no claim for compensation is filed with the In-
dustrial Commission within three years from the date 
of the accident or the datae of last payment of com-
pensation, the right to compensation shall be wholly 
barred.'' 
The general statute of limitations, Sec. 104-2-24.10, 
also provides: 
"An action for a liability created by the statutes 
of this State, other than for a penalty or forfeiture un-
der the laws of this State, except where in special cases 
a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of 
this State, shall be commenced within three years." 
In the case of Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, 
93 Utah 510, 74 P. 2d 657, it was held, contrary to earlier 
cases, that the duty to pay workmen's compensation does 
not arise until there is an accident and injury and disability 
and loss from injury, and the cause of action arises when 
I 
I 
I 
' 
I 
I 
I 
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the employer refuses or ceases to pay compensation after 
the duty arises in such manner. 
In Hallstrom v. Industrial Commission, 96 Utah 85, 83 
P. 2d 730, the same rule was adhered to, but under the facts, 
the "compensable" injury was held to have existed for 
about six years, and compensation was therefore denied. 
The Supreme Court in Williams v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 95 Utah 376, 81 P. 2d l349, reversed the decision of 
the Industrial Commission and held that where the files of 
the Industrial Commission and the testimony did not re-
veal when the impairment of employee's eye became no-
ticeable, nor when the loss of sight became complete, and 
the Commission made no findings in either particular, nor 
as to whether the disability was due to the accident, a rul-
ing that the one year statute of limitations began to run 
from the date of accident was error. 
The evidence disclosed as to McKee that he continued 
to work with regularity until 1946, when he experienced 
partial paralysis; and there is no showing that his actual 
disability, except for the advice of Dr. Taylor, which we 
shall notice later, began more than three years before he 
filed his application. 
All of the Utah cases seem to leave open the question 
of just what is a "compensable accident" which starts the 
time running under L. 39, Ch. 51, which amended the exist-
ing law, under which the above mentioned cases were de-
cided, by adding the provision above quoted from Sec. 42-
1-92, UCA, 1943. It is believed that upon the basis of prin-
ciple, McKee's accident did not become compensable until 
within three years from the filing of his application. It is 
further believed that should the legislature by the 1939 
amendment have intended, or should the statute be con-
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strued to provide for, the limitation of an industrial acci-
dent claim solely on the basis of the time of the happening 
of an accident, without reference to whether there was any 
disability, .such statute as so interpreted or intended would 
be unconstitutional as a deprivation of life, liberty and 
property without due process of law as applied to disability 
first becoming manifest after the three years. This would 
follow from the fact that the general workmen's compen-
sataion statute would preclude a recovery within the three 
years by reason of the absence of disability, and the limi-
tation statute would preclude recovery thereafter. Thus, 
a fundamental right would be effectually precluded, with-
out redress of any kind. 
Under other circumstances, we would be glad to fur-
ther argue these questions, for our position is that the ac-
tion is not barred under the doctrine of the Salt Lake City 
case, supra, even in view of the 1939 amendment. However, 
there is another principle directly involved herein which 
appearSj determinative, and which seems to remove any 
doubt that might otherwise exist as to the interpretation 
of the amended statute. 
Following McKee's accident of February, 1944, he re-
ported to Dr. Fred R. Taylor, who was admitted to be the 
regular doctor for, and representing, the pipe company, in 
order to get a clearance to go back to work. Dr. Taylor 
took x-rays of applicant's back, and, after having examined 
such x-rays, wrote the following letter to the Pacific States 
Cast Iron Pipe Company, giving substantially the same in-
formation orally to Mr. McKee: 
Applicant's Exhibit "A" (Received in evidence, 62-63) 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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Clinic 
9 
Dr. Fred W. Taylor 
Dr. Fred R. Taylor 
Dr. Albert R. Taylor 
Physicians and Surgeons 
Provo, Utah 
March 14, 1944 
Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co. 
Provo, Utah re: Bert McKee 
Gentlemen: 
Mr. McKee reported to the office Feb. 28, 1944 be-
cause of pain in his back. He had been under the care 
of a chiropractor for some time who said his back was 
in place. 
X-rays were taken which showed no bony deformi-
ty. General examination showed no infection of the 
sinuses, tonsils slightly red, teeth-upper false, lower 
in good condition. Heart and lungs normal, blood pres-
sure 120/70, abdomen no masses, no tenderness, pros-
tate average size, no pus, urine negative. Back lists 
to right, muscles in spasm, movements limited. 
Straight leg raising difficult, and both leg raising im-
possible. 
In view of these findings a diagnosis of lumbago 
was made, and he was advised to seek a change of oc-
cupation. There is a history of similar condition occur-
ring when he was working for your company before, 
and he states he has had no trouble since that time. 
FRT/hw 
Very truly, 
jsj Fred R. Taylor 
(RECEIVED Mar 16 1944 
P.S.C.I.P.CO.) 
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At the hearing it was testified by Dr. Paul Richards, 
and not disputed by the defendant, that Dr. Taylor's own 
x-rays, which he had before him at the time of writing his 
letter, showed the slipping in the lumbar region which was 
the cause of Mr. McKee's difficulty; in fact, Dr. Richards 
said Dr. Taylor's x-rays showed the same condition as the 
subsequent x-rays showed (159). Neither lumbago nor 
rheumatism was indicated, and muscular spasms would 
simply be a symptom of this back condition. 
It is also undisputed in the record that applicant and 
those doctors whom applicant consulted after he was re-
leased from work because of Dr. Taylor's recommendation 
and his assumed condition of "muscular spasms" and "lum-
bago", relied upon Dr. Taylor's finding, particularly be-
cause he alone had the benefit of the x-rays. Can the pipe 
company, then, take advantage of the mistake or fraud of 
its own representative and bar a claim because an employee 
took the word of such representative who was in the best 
position to know what the fact was? 
Even in 1947, when the continued and increasing dif-
ficulty led to the taking of other x-rays, the pipe company 
withheld the 1944 x-rays and the true condition of the em-
ployee, and particulars of his condition had to be ascer-
tained on the basis of independent inquiry, without any 
cooperation from the pipe company. Some of the diffi-
culty that the applicant was laboring under, and also 
the fact that even before his formal application was filed, 
he applied to the Industrial Commission for aid, are indi-
cated by applicant's Exhibit "H", which is a letter he wrote 
to the Industrial Commission under date of September 1, 
194 7, as follows: 
l 
i 
I 
I 
I 
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RECEIVED 
( Sept 3 1947 
(The Industrial Com-) 
( mission of Utah ) 
Dear Sirs: 
Spanish Fork, Utah 
Sept 1st 1947 
In regards to the information concerning the Back 
Injury I came in last week and seen you about. I could 
get the reports from Dr. Orton, and I am sending them 
just as he gave them to us. Dr. Taylor has turned all 
reports including the Xrays over to the Pipe Plant. 
They would show them to me but refused to give any 
of the dates. They said if you wanted them you could 
get them by writing for them. They have all of the 
dates and also a letter from Dr. Taylor saying he 
treated me for my Injurys. 
We will be expecting to hear from you soon con-
cerning this trouble. 
Sincerely Yours 
My Address: Bert T. McKee 
328 East 4th N. 
Spanish Fork, Utah 
js/ Bert McKee 
We desire to quote also from the testimony of the pipe 
company's office manager, Mr. Shaw (118-119). 
BY MR. LOWE: 
"Q. Do you remember an occasion sometime in 
1947 when Mr. McKee came to your office and asked 
to be shown certain documents and x-rays? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Can you place the approximate date? 
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A. No, I can't place an exact date. It appears in 
my mind that he came to my office sometime in the 
fall. I didn't write down the date or anything pertain-
ing to it. Ot that time I recommended or told Mr. 
McKee that if he wanted the x-rays that we would sub-
mit them to the Commission, or any other information 
he desired. 
Q. That was sometime in the fall of 1947? 
A. Yes, but I can't fix a date on it. 
Q. Do you know it was after the spring of 1947. 
A. Yes, it seems it was sometime last fall. 
MR. LOWE: That is all" 
BY MR. CHRISTENSON: 
"You had the x-rays how long before Mr. McKee 
came to see you? 
A. Oh, the x-rays have been in our possession 
since Dr. Taylor turned them over to us. 
Q. And that was probably shortly after they 
were taken? 
A. I don't know when they were turned over to 
us. 
Q. So far as you know they had been for a long 
time? 
A. I think so. 
Q. And you also didn't give Mr. McKee any state-
ment of his work record, did you? 
A. No sir. 
Q. He asked for it. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you declined to give him that? 
A. I declined to give him that because I didn't 
feel there was any justification for him coming into our 
office and examining the records other than through 
an order. 
Q. That would be the attitude of the company? 
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A. I think that is the attitude of the company. 
It just does not want anyone promiscuously going 
through these records. 
Q. Did he ask you about seeing his own work 
record? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now you figured the x-rays were company 
property? 
A. I thought so. 
Q. They are taken by the regular company phy-
sician? 
A. Yes. 
Q. For the company? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he was asking for them? 
A. Yes." 
McKee's application was filed well within three years 
from the discovery of the misrepresentation of the pipe 
company's doctor and the concealment of the pipe com-
pany. To say that a workman under such circumstances 
must be turned away without assistance which he other-
wise would justly merit, simply because he did not file his 
application before he discovered the representations of his 
employer with respect to his condition were false, would 
constitute the n1ost keen injustice. Fortunately, no rule 
of law with respect to limitation or otherwise requires such 
a result. 
We refer to the case of Anderson v. Contract Trucking 
Co. (New Mexico) 146 P. (2d) 873, for the application of 
the principle upon which we rely. There, where an em-
ployee at the time of injury to his eye was led to believe 
by the company doctor that the injury was trivial and at-
tributed growing eye weakness to natural causes, and did 
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not discover that his eyesight was practically gone until 
consulting an eye specialist more than two years thereafter, 
his claim for compensation, which was filed within the 
statutory time after the discovery of the seriousness of the 
injury, was not barred. 
It matters not whether the 1944 accident, concerning 
which there is no dispute, was the sole cause of the present 
condition, or united with the result of the 1937 accident, or 
a congenital condition, to cause the disability found by the 
Commission. The 1944 accident was an industrial acci-
dent arising out of, and in the course of employment and a 
cause of the subsequent arid present disability. Even were 
there some question about this, the Industrial Commission 
should resolve doubts in favor of the applicant and his de-
pendents, and grant compensation, as the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act should be liberally construed. Salt Lake City 
v. Industrial Commission, et al, 104 Utah 436, 140 P. 2d 
644 . Here, there is not a question of resolving doubts in 
favor of applicant. The record shows without substantial 
dispute that applicant did, in 1944, ~uffer an industrial ac-
cident in the course of, and arising out of, his employment, 
and is now seriously disabled as a result thereof. The only 
question remaining is whether his claim is barred, and that 
is a question of law which the record, we submit, requires 
to be answered in favor of the applicant. 
There is no doubt that applicant's foreman knew im-
mediately of the accident in 1944 and, in fact, told him to 
go home. It has been repeatedly held that this satisfies 
the statute with respect to notice to employer. There is no 
question, moreover, that if an application has been filed any 
time within three years from the 1944 accident, compen-
sation would have to be allowed. Yet, the pipe company's 
I 
I 
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doctor precluded the prompt filing of a claim by his state-
ments to both McKee and his employer, which were relied 
upon by McKee. We do not think it should be said that 
reliance upon the pipe plant's own representative worked 
a forfeiture of McKee's claim and thus a substantial gain 
to the pipe company. 
If the doctor intentionally misled the applicant, it would 
be unthinkable that his company should be permitted to 
benefit. If he did so carelessly or wantonly, without intend-
ing the result, it would still be contrary to fundamental prin-
ciples of justice that the company should be able to take 
advantage of the carelessness of its own doctor to bar a 
valid claim. The doctor was the only one who had access to 
the x-rays, and Dr. Richards testified those x-rays showed 
the back condition. Then, even in 194 7, when the back 
condition became known, the company withheld Dr. Tay-
lor's x-rays and other information from the applicant. Will 
the law permit a company to mislead an employee and then 
bar a valid claim because the applicant was, in fact, mis-
led? Such would seem contrary to public policy. We sub-
mit that the statute of limitations has been waived and that 
the company is estopped to raise or rely upon it by reason 
of the facts and circumstances shown without dispute in 
the record. 
No one now contends that Dr. Taylor was right in tel-
ling McKee his back was all right, and his trouble was mus-
cular spasms. and rheumatism, or lumbago. The company, 
in view of Dr. Taylor's own letter, cannot claim this. The 
undisputed evidence is that Dr. Taylor's x-rays showed the 
same condition as is now shown on the Orton x-rays and 
the Richards x-rays. Not only were Dr. Taylor's x-rays 
withheld from McKee, but an affirmative misrepresentation 
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as to what the x-rays showed was made by the company 
doctor acting in the course of his employment. It is sig-
nificant to note, as Dr. Richards established, that as a rule 
rheumatism over a substantial period of time has an effect 
on the bone structure, and that there was no indication of 
rheumatism on the x-rays (166). 
The applicant is in serious condition, which now every-
one admits is not merely rheumatism or muscular spasms. 
If Dr. Taylor had been right in his statement, applicant 
would not have been entitled to compensation. Applicant 
believed, and had the right to rely upon, Dr. Taylor. Dr. 
Orton relied upon Dr. Taylor, because Dr. Taylor was the 
only one who had seen and x-rays up until 1946. 
Now, the company should not say to the applicant: 
"Our doctor was in error when he told you your back 
was all right. Although he had the correct infonna-
tion in the x-rays themselves, and you relied upon him, 
wa will take advantage of your belief in our agent. 
Not only will you have to put up with the extra years 
of suffering, but you cannot even now secure relief or 
help because our agent was wrong and you believed 
him. We claim the right to hide behind th,e mistake of 
our doctor, work a substantial enrichment of ourselves, 
and bar you from help which may mean your life!" 
Such a position, if that be the position of defendant, 
is untenable in law or equity. Yet, unless that be the po-
sition of defendant, they must admit liability, as a proper 
claim was filed well within three years from the discovery 
that Dr. Taylor was wrong. 
It is heartening again to find in this connection from 
the adjudicated cases that the law, while of necessity deal-
I 
l 
I 
I 
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ing in general, and sometimes rigid rules, regards basic jus-
tice as of supreme importance. Fundamental justice, we 
submit, requires that McKee receive compensation. The 
authorities, recognizing that the rules of law are intended, 
and should tie applied, to promote justice, and not to facili-
tate injustice, so indicate. 
It has long been recognized by the statutes of this state 
L.'1at an action based on fraud or mistake will not be deemed 
to have accrued until the discovery of the facts constituting 
the fraud or mistake. 104-2-24 (3), UCA, 19;1:3. The rule 
_that the defendant having, by his own wrongdoing, preven-
ted plaintiff from instituting his suit, will not be permitted 
to take advantage of his own wrong by setting up the stat-
ute of lin1itations as a defense, is applicable irrespective of 
whether the action itself is based on fraud. Pashley vs. 
Pacific Electric Co., et al (Calif.) 153 P. 2d 325; Peteler v. 
Robison, 81 Utah 535, 17 P. 2d 244. 
Where physicians are employed by a company to treat 
an injured person, the physicians, nevertheless, as to such 
person, occupy a position of trust and confidence, and their 
concealment of the seriousness of the injuries will be im-
puted to the company in determining whether the statute 
of limitation was tolled against the company. Pashley v. 
Pacific Electric Co., et al, supra. 
Under the general rules of law governing all classes of 
cases, concealment, or even mistake, may toll the statute 
of limitations. (See annotation "Limitations-Effect of 
Concealment", 173 ALR 576.) But particularly, in the case 
of an application for industrial compensation would it seem 
that every protection against over-reaching by employers 
or their agents should be afforded. Such protection should 
not require the presence of fraud in the strict sense. No 
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employer in this type of case should be permitted to bene-
fit at the expense of its employees by any questionable cir-
cumstances such as herein involved. 
We call attention to the New Mexico case of Anderson 
v. Contract Trucking Co., supra, which adapts the reason-
ing of Salt Lake City v. Industrial Commission, supra, to 
the effect that the statute should not be interpreted to re-
quire the period of limitations to "begin to run before the 
cause of action accrues". But it is with respect to estoppel 
that this case seems especially pertinent, and we quote from 
the opinion of the Court on this point: 
"But, say defendants, even should this court ap-
ply the rule that the statute starts running from the 
date the injury becomes apparent as one compensable, 
rather than from the date of the accident, still plain-
tiff could not recover. He knew, say defendants, at 
least as early as April 18, 1941, when he secured glas-
ses from an optometrist, that his eyesight was some-
what impaired and therefore the claim should have 
been filed at least within a year and thirty-one days 
thereafter. We are unable to agree to the soundness 
of this contention. It was not until plaintiff had con-
sulted an eye specialist that he discovered that his eye-
sight was practically gone. Then, for the first time, 
the growing weakness of the eye was traced to the ac-
cident of Nov., 1940, which accident, plaintiff had been 
led to believe by the doctor who examined him at the 
time (the doctor of the employer, incidentally) , could 
not have set in motion an effect leading to impairment 
of vision. We need not set out herein more detail than 
is shown in the trial court's findings the action of plain-
tiff prior to seeking the advice of the eye specialist 
in seeking to correct 'his failing vision. Plaintiff could 
well have attributed this growing eye weakness to nat-
ural causes and advancing age. We cannot say that 
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there was not substantial evidence to support the trial 
court's finding that he did not know, or have reason 
to know, prior to the time the specialist had seen him 
that he had suffered this serious injury which would 
progress to total blindness." 
And from the special concurring opinion of Justice 
Bickley in the same case: 
"A notable illustration is the Mumford case, sup-
ra, in which it was apparent from the time of the acci-
dent that the injury was compensable. The claim al-
leged: 'Such injury has caused the complete loss of the 
sight of the left eye caused by the splashing of hot 
creosote * * * '. The answer of the insurer stated: 
' * * * admits the allegations in said claim', but 
denied liability for the reason, 'that said employer had 
actual knowledge of said injury within two weeks 
after the occurrence thereof and no compensation nor 
any part thereof was paid by said employer or this de-
fendant within thirty-one days after the date of said 
accident and injury.' 
"Thus, the defendant in that case, with keen dis-
crimination, fixes the time of the failure or refusal to 
pay as the starting point of the limitation period for 
the purpose of its plea that the claim was barred. 
"In the case at bar the situation is quite different. 
The defendants here state that the claim is barred be-
cause not filed within one year after the occurrence 
of the accident and injury or after the refusal or fail-
ure of the e1nployer to pay the same. Yet they create 
no situation by the evidence to show they had know-
ledge of a compensable injury from which a refusal or 
failure to pay could be inferred. In fact, the only evi-
dence on the subject shows that the defendants dis-
claim having knowledge of a compensable injury, al-
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though the employer knew of the accident and of the 
injury, in the sense of physical harm and disturbance 
of the eye. But they regarded the injury as a trivial 
one and hence non-compensable." 
There is a similar anomaly here. The pipe plant, al-
though their foreman knew applicant left work following 
the accident to his back in 1944, is in no position to say that 
it, not to mention McKee, knew of any compensable disa-
bility to the back, since McKee was released because of 
"rheumatism and muscular spasms" after being assured 
that there was nothing wrong with his back. We draw at-
tention to the peculiar position in which the pipe plant now 
finds itself in contending that McKee is now barred from 
claiming compensation for a compensable injury which it, 
up to the time of the hearing, represented did not exist! 
But the controlling point is that it is estopped from claiming 
the benefit of the statute of limitations by reason of the 
circumstances hereinbefore discussed. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that compensation should be allowed. Only 
by this action will the intent of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act be served, fairness promoted and the applicant 
furnished means, in accordance with law, through opera-
tive procedure recommended by Dr. Richards, to save him-
self from total paralysis, or even more serious consequen-
ces. 
The claim of the applicant not being barred, and the 
applicant otherwise being entitled to compensation by the 
great weight of the evidence and in accordance with the 
findings of the Commission, we submit that the decision 
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of the Commission should be reversed with respect to the 
statute of limitations, and that it should be ordered to grant 
compensation and n1edical expenses to the applicant as pro-
vided by law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSON & CHRISTENSON, 
Attorneys for Applicant 
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